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Abstract
We first show that there are practical situations in for instance
forensic and gambling settings, in which applying classical probability
theory, that is, based on the axioms of Kolmogorov, is problematic. We
then introduce and discuss Shafer belief functions. Technically, Shafer
belief functions generalize probability distributions. Philosophically,
they pertain to individual or shared knowledge of facts, rather than
to facts themselves, and therefore can be interpreted as generalizing
epistemic probability, that is, probability theory interpreted epis-
temologically. Belief functions are more flexible and better suited
to deal with certain types of uncertainty than classical probability
distributions. We develop a new calculus for belief functions which
does not use the much criticized Dempster’s rule of combination, by
generalizing the classical notions of conditioning and independence in
a natural and uncontroversial way. Using this calculus, we explain our
rejection of Dempster’s rule in detail. We apply the new theory to a
number of examples, including a gambling example and an example in
a forensic setting. We prove a law of large numbers for belief functions
and offer a betting interpretation similar to the Dutch Book Theorem
for probability distributions.
Keywords: Belief Functions, Conditioning, Independence, Modeling igno-
rance, Law of large numbers, Epistemic interpretation, Gambling, Rejection
of Dempster’s rule, Lack of additivity.
1 Introduction
In many situations, the classical Kolmogorov axioms for probability lead to a
very useful theory, with many connections to other branches of mathematics
and with numerous important applications. The axioms themselves can
1
be justified in many ways, for instance via a frequentistic interpretation
of probabilities. In such a frequentistic interpretation, we take relative
frequencies in repeated experiments as the motivation and justification of
the axioms. Other justifications for the axioms of Kolmogorov are possible
as well, see e.g. [9] and references below.
This is not to say, however, that the Kolmogorov axioms should be
the only and exclusive way to deal with uncertainty. Especially when
uncertainty is interpreted epistemologically, that is, relating to knowledge
of facts rather than to facts themselves, it is not always the case that the
classical axiom of additivity adequately describes the situation at hand. For
instance, in a legal or forensic setting it has already been debated for several
decades as to what extent the classical theory of probability and alternatives
to it, are useful and/or suitable for assessing the value of evidence, see e.g.
[7], [3], [13], [1], [18]. There is a number of aspects about modeling epistemic
uncertainty for which the classical approach is problematic, and we start our
contribution with a short discussion of these.
First it has been observed by many that the classical theory cannot
distinguish between lack of belief and disbelief. Here, disbelief is associated
with evidence indicating the negation of a proposition, whereas lack of belief
is associated with not having evidence at all. As Shafer [15] puts it, the
classical theory does not allow one to withhold belief from a proposition
without according that belief to the negation of the proposition. When we
want to apply a theory of probabilities to legal issues, this becomes a relevant
issue. Indeed, if certain exculpatory evidence in a case is dismissed, then
this may result in less belief in the innocence of the suspect, but it gives no
further indication for guilt.
The second shortcoming of the classical theory is its inability to model
ignorance on an individual level in situations where only group information
is available. Here is a classical example.
Example 1.1. (The island problem) In the classical version of the island
problem (see e.g. [17] and [2]) a crime has been committed on an island,
making it a certainty that an inhabitant of the island committed it. In the
absence of any further information, the classical point of view is to assign a
uniform prior probability over all inhabitants concerning the question who is
the culprit. However, this does not correspond to our knowledge. We know
for sure that someone in the population committed the crime, but have no
further belief about any individual. It would, therefore, be unreasonable to
assign any further individual belief to the guilt of an individual, other than
the fact that the population to which he or she belongs receives belief 1.
This last fact distinguishes members from the population from individuals
outside it. However, the combination of assigning degree of belief 1 to the
collection of all inhabitants and 0 to each individual is impossible under the
classical axioms of probability, although this may be exactly the prior one
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wants to impose.
We will apply the theory we are about to develop to this example in
Section 6.1. There we will see that using an uninformative prior, which is
possible in our theory, leads to a different result than using a uniform prior.
The fact that these priors lead to different results confirms that these priors
are really distinct: a uniform prior is not a prior representing ignorance, and
using a uniform prior does not lead to the same results as using a prior that
does represent ignorance.
This example suggest that the usual additivity, that is, P (A) + P (B) =
P (A ∪ B) if A and B are disjoint, is not always desirable when P is
interpreted epistemologically, as is often the case in legal or forensic settings.
In such a setting, one needs to model uncertainty on the level of knowledge
that one actually has, and there is no reason to suppose that individual
or shared knowledge can always be adequately described by a classical
underlying probability distribution, known or unknown.
We next give a gambling example which is, like Example 1.1, just another
example of the inability of probability distributions to express ignorance.
Example 1.2. Suppose a fair coin is flipped. However, with probability
p > 0, the person flipping the coin gets the opportunity to change the
outcome of the flip. In ignorance about the way the person makes his or her
decisions, we can not give a probability distribution describing the outcome
of this process. We can not even assume that there necessarily exists a
probability distribution describing the decisions of this person. Our theory
will, nevertheless, allow us to make quantitative statements on which we can
base gambling strategies in this situation, see Section 6.2.
Already back in the seventies of the previous century, there has been an
attempt by Shafer [15] to develop a theory of probabilities outside the realm
of the axioms of Kolmogorov. He introduced the concept of a belief function,
which is a generalization of a probability distribution. Belief functions are
not necessarily additive and allow for the flexibility that our examples ask
for. Based on the concept, Shafer also introduced a calculus for belief
functions centered around the so called Dempster’s rule of combination.
However, his attempt has been criticized fiercely (references below), for
various and good reasons, and nowadays belief functions are hardly used, if
at all, in mainstream applied probability.
In this article, we aim to re-develop the theory of belief functions, using
the basic concept of Shafer, but setting up a new calculus without using
Dempster’s rule. We think that our revision takes away the three reasons
why people have rejected Shafer’s belief functions before, which we now
discuss.
The first important obstacle is reported by Shafer himself in [16].
Probability has a betting interpretation based on the Dutch Book Theorem,
which traces back to Ramsey [12] and de Finetti [5]. Shafer writes that
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many of his critics rejected them because of the lack of a suitable betting
interpretation for belief functions. Shafer himself argues in [16] that no such
behavioral interpretation is necessary. We do not have to follow that line of
reasoning, because in Section 9 we present a betting interpretation based on
a characterization of belief functions (Theorem 9.2), much like the betting
interpretation of probability based on the Dutch Book Theorem.
What is probably the biggest concern about Shafer’s belief functions, see
e.g. [14] and [6], is Dempster’s rule of combination. This rule of combination
is supposed to describe how different belief functions that are based on
‘independent evidence’ should be combined into a new one. Let us be clear
about this point: we also reject Dempster’s rule and the calculus that stems
from it. In Section 5 we explain how the rule confuses ‘independence’ of
evidence and ‘independence’ of phenomena. While the troubled notion
of ‘independent evidence’ has no place in our new theory, we do have a
mathematical notion of ‘independent phenomena’ as a generalization of
independence in probability theory (see Section 4). Despite our rejection of
Dempster’s rule, in the current article we do develop a very useful calculus
of belief functions without using Dempster’s rule. The only thing we need is
a proper rule for conditioning, and this is much less controversial, if at all.
This should take care of the points raised in [14] and [6].
The third concern about belief functions concerns the question whether
or not they represent knowledge or belief in a meaningful epistemological
way. Pearl in [11], for instance, questions whether or not belief functions
respect some ‘rules’ of reasoning. For the most part, Pearl’s criticism does
not apply to our theory and how we want to use it, the exception being a
point about belief updating. In Section 3, after we introduced our rule of
conditioning, we address this point.
The theory of belief functions which we are about to re-develop is,
foremost, an epistemic theory on the level of individual or shared knowledge.
The fact that we undertake this effort implicitly implies that we think that
there are many situations in which classical epistemic interpretations fall
short; see our examples above. Our motivation for reviving the theory of
belief functions hence lies in the fact that knowledge (or lack thereof) does
not always fit into the classical framework, and that the classical axioms of
probability theory are not always suitable for an epistemic interpretation.
For an overview of classical epistemic interpretations we refer to [8] and the
references therein.
On the technical level, belief functions are a generalization of classical
probability theory in the sense that any probability distribution is also a
belief function. So, if there are reasons to assume that the quantities we
want to describe can be adequately modeled by assuming an underlying
classical probability distribution, then the theory of belief functions allows
for that. In other words, we lose nothing.
For the applications of the theory to forensic examples, we refer to our
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companion paper [10] that has an in-depth discussion of such applications.
We will restrict our discussion to finite outcome spaces. In all examples in
which we want to apply the theory, the outcome spaces are finite, and it
is probably a good idea to study and develop a new theory in the simplest
possible setting first anyway.
The current paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce
belief functions and some basic results. In Section 3 and 4 we develop
the backbone of our calculus by discussing the concepts of respectively
conditioning and independence. In Section 5 we explain why we reject
Dempster’s rule of combination using the insights of our own calculus. In
Section 6 we discuss the behavior of the theory in a gambling example, and
with an example in a forensic setting. After that we discuss the relation
between belief functions and a special collection of classical probability
distributions in Section 7, a law of large numbers for belief functions in
Section 8, and finally in Section 9 we offer a betting interpretation for belief
functions.
Is is unavoidable that in the discussion of the basics of the theory, there
is some overlap with our companion paper [10]. It has been our aim to make
both papers self-contained.
2 The basics
Let Ω be a finite outcome space. We want to make statements about the
elements of Ω in the presence of uncertainty. The classical way to do this
is by means of a suitable probability distribution on Ω. A probability
distribution assigns a non-negative weight p(ω) to each element ω ∈ Ω in
such a way that the total weight is equal to 1. We may, for instance, express
our uncertainty about who is the culprit by means of such a probability
distribution. The probability that the culprit can be found in a subset A of
Ω is then equal to
P (A) :=
∑
ω∈A
p(ω). (2.1)
The probability measure P can be interpreted as epistemic, frequentistic or
otherwise, depending on the context and personal taste. The weight p(ω)
represents the probability, degree of belief, or confidence in the outcome ω,
and P (A) represents our probability, degree of belief, or confidence in an
outcome which is contained in A. In classical probability theory, a subset of
Ω is also called an event or a hypothesis, and P describes the probability of
all such events or hypotheses.
Next we define basic belief assignments and belief functions. The
difference between a basic belief assignment and a probability distribution,
is that the former assigns weights to nonempty subsets of Ω rather than to
individual outcomes. We write 2Ω for the collection of all subsets of Ω.
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Definition 2.1. A function m : 2Ω → [0, 1] is a basic belief assignment if
m(∅) = 0 and ∑
C⊆Ω
m(C) = 1. (2.2)
Whereas p(ω) represents the probability or confidence in the outcome
ω, m(C) represents our confidence in an outcome in C without any further
specification which element of C is the outcome. In slightly different words,
we can interpret m(C) as the probability of having knowledge precisely C.
It may appear that there is not much difference between P and m, but
in fact there is. The crucial difference between P andm is that the weight of
a subset C of Ω is not immediately related to the weights of the elements or
subsets of C. For instance, if we have no clue whatsoever about the outcome,
that is, if we have no information at all other than that the outcome is in
Ω, then we may express this by putting m(Ω) = 1 and m(A) = 0 for all
strict subsets of Ω. If we want to assign belief 1/2 to the union of a and b
without making individual statements about a and b, then we can express
this as m({a, b}) = 1/2 and simultaneously m({a}) = m({b}) = 0. It is
also possible that a basic belief functions only assigns positive weight to
singletons. In such a case, we are back in the classical situation.
The quantity m(C) is sometimes referred to as the weight of the evidence
that points precisely to C. We should view m as the analogue of p in the
classical description above. Next we define the analogue of P , which is called
a belief function.
We want to quantify how much belief we can assign to a subset A of Ω.
To this end, we consider all sets C in Ω with C ⊆ A, which are precisely the
events whose occurrence implies the occurrence of A. The belief in a set A
now is the sum of the weights of all subsets of A. In terms of evidence, the
belief in A is the total weight of all evidence which implies A.
Definition 2.2. Given a basic belief assignment m : 2Ω → [0, 1], the
corresponding belief function Bel : 2Ω → [0, 1] is defined by
Bel(A) :=
∑
C⊆A
m(C). (2.3)
The most natural interpretation of the theory is to see a subset
of outcomes as a representation or description of individual or shared
knowledge, and that we quantify our knowledge with belief functions. In
slightly different words, the belief in A is the probability to have information
or evidence which implies the occurrence of A.
The set Ω on the one hand, and singletons on the other, are the extreme
states of knowledge, representing respectively ignorance (we do not know
anything about the outcome other than that it is in Ω) and complete
knowledge (we know which element of Ω is the outcome). The empty
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set represents knowing a contradiction which is impossible and hence has
probability zero.
Example 2.3. (Probability distributions) Every probability distribution is a
belief function. To see this, let P : 2Ω → [0, 1] be a probability distribution.
Set m({ω}) = P ({ω}) for all ω ∈ Ω and m(C) = 0 for all C such that
|C| > 1. Then we get
Bel(A) =
∑
a∈A
m({a}) =
∑
a∈A
P ({a}) = P (A) (2.4)
for every A ⊆ Ω. Probability distributions are belief functions for which
the corresponding basic belief assignment only assigns positive weight to
singletons.
If m(C) > 0 for some C with |C| > 1, then Bel is not a probability
distribution because it not additive: for any nonempty, disjoint A,B ⊆ Ω
such that A ∪B = C we find
Bel(A ∪B) > Bel(A) + Bel(B). (2.5)
Example 2.4. Suppose we want to state our beliefs about a suspect being
guilty or innocent, so Ω = {guilty, innocent} is our outcome space. If the
only evidence we have, is evidence of weight p that the suspect is innocent,
then we have m({innocent}) = p, m({guilty}) = 0 and m(Ω) = 1−p. Notice
that the belief that the suspect is guilty is not equal to 1 minus the belief
that the suspect is innocent. The corresponding belief function Bel is given
by Bel({guilty}) = 0, Bel({innocent}) = p and Bel(Ω) = 1.
Example 2.5. The function m for which m(Ω) = 1 and m(A) = 0 for all
other A ⊆ Ω is a basic belief assignment. The corresponding belief function
assigns belief 1 to Ω and belief zero to all strict subsets of Ω. This belief
function expresses total ignorance within a given population Ω, except for
the fact that the outcome must be in Ω. As such it addresses the problem
noticed in Example 1.1.
Example 2.6. With reference to the situation described in Example 1.2, we
let Ω = {h, t} be the outcome space of the first croupier, where h stands for
‘head’ and t for ‘tail’. We set the basic belief assignment m : 2Ω → [0, 1] by
m({h}) = m({t}) = 12(1− p) and m({h, t}) = p.
There is a natural way to identify a belief functions with a collection
of probability distributions, namely the collection PBel of all probability
distributions that one can obtain by distributing a total mass of m(C) over
the elements of C, for all C ⊆ Ω. For instance, if m(Ω) = 1, then the
corresponding PBel consists of all probability distributions on Ω. If Ω =
{0, 1}, and m({0}) = 1−m({0, 1}) = 13 , then PBel consists of all probability
distributions that assign probability at least 13 to 0.
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It is not difficult to see that
Bel(A) = min
P∈PBel
P (A). (2.6)
Indeed, only for sets C which are completely contained in A, their massm(C)
contributes to Bel(A), and those are precisely the sets whose mass cannot
be moved outside A. This identity might lead to the idea to interpret PBel
as describing all the possible underlying probability distributions, one of
which is the “correct” one, still keeping the idea that the actual situation
is described by an (unknown) probability distribution from the collection
PBel.
It is this interpretation which is criticized in [11]. This interpretation of
PBel is closely tied with the theory of ‘minimum probability’ that has been
studied, see e.g. [16]. This theory, however, is distinct from our theory. In
Section 3, for example, we will see that conditional belief is not equal to the
infimum over all conditional probabilities in PBel. In Section 7 we discuss
the interpretation of PBel in more detail.
Whereas belief functions are in general not additive, it follows directly
from the definition that they are superadditive, i.e.
Bel(A ∪B) ≥ Bel(A) + Bel(B) (2.7)
for all disjoint A,B ⊆ Ω. The following theorem by Shafer [15] shows
that belief functions are characterized by a property between additivity and
super-additivity.
Theorem 2.7. A function Bel : 2Ω → [0, 1] is a belief function if and only
if
(B1) Bel(Ω) = 1
(B2) For all A,B ⊆ Ω we have
Bel(A ∪B) ≥ Bel(A) + Bel(B)− Bel(A ∩B). (2.8)
Remark 2.8. To see that (B2) is stricter than super-additivity, consider the
following example. Let Ω = {a, b, c} and set f(Ω) = f({a, b}) = f({b, c}) =
1, f({b}) = 12 and f(C) = 0 for all other C. It is easy to check f is
superadditive, but (B2) does not hold since
1 = f(Ω) 6≥ f({a, b}) + f({b, c}) − f({b}) =
3
2
. (2.9)
Theorem 2.7 can be used to give an alternative definition of belief
functions without deriving them from basic belief assignments. Using the
theorem we can directly check whether or not a function f : 2Ω → [0, 1] is
a belief function. We can use the following lemma by Shafer [15] to retrieve
the basic belief assignment corresponding to a given belief function.
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Lemma 2.9. Every belief function Bel : 2Ω → [0, 1] has a unique
corresponding basic probability assignment m : 2Ω → [0, 1] which is given
by
m(A) =
∑
C⊆A
(−1)|A|−|C|Bel(C). (2.10)
3 Conditioning
We have discussed the mathematical definitions and basic properties of belief
functions. The next thing on the agenda is to investigate how belief functions
change when additional or new information is provided. This is akin to the
classical situation in which a prior probability is updated into a posterior one,
based on additional information. In this section we explain how this works
in our setting. The first thing to do is to determine how a belief function
changes under additional information, or under a certain hypothesis. This
means we need to understand how conditioning works in our context.
The rule we propose for conditioning is described as follows. Suppose
we have a basic belief assignment m and corresponding belief function Bel.
We want to condition on an event H. The weight of the evidence m(A) for
A now becomes weight of evidence for A ∩H, if A is consistent with H in
the sense that A ∩H 6= ∅. If A ∩H = ∅, then the new weight of evidence
for A becomes zero. Next we rescale the weights of the evidence in such a
way that the weights again sum up to 1. This can of course only be done if
there is evidence with positive weight that is consistent with H. This leads
to the following definition.
Definition 3.1. Let m : 2Ω → [0, 1] be a basic belief assignment and Bel
the corresponding belief function. For H ⊆ Ω such that Bel(Hc) 6= 1 we
define the conditional basic belief assignment mH : 2
Ω → [0, 1] by
mH(A) :=
∑
B∩H=Am(B)
1−
∑
B∩H=∅m(B)
, (3.1)
for A 6= ∅ and mH(∅) = 0.
The corresponding conditional belief function BelH can now be obtained
in the obvious way from the basic belief assignment mH , as follows:
BelH(A) =
∑
B⊆A
mH(B)
=
∑
∅6=C∩H⊆Am(C)
1−
∑
C∩H=∅m(C)
=
∑
C⊆A∪Hc m(C)−
∑
C⊆Hc m(C)
1−
∑
C⊆Hc m(C)
=
Bel(A ∪Hc)− Bel(Hc)
1− Bel(Hc)
(3.2)
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for all A and H such that Bel(Hc) 6= 1.
Readers familiar with the work of Shafer [15] will notice that (3.2)
is the same formula as (3.8) in [15]), and is sometimes called Dempster-
conditioning. This name is somewhat misleading though. Indeed, Shafer
derives the formula as a special case of Dempster’s rule, a rule which we
reject. It so happens that one can derive (3.2) without Dempster’s rule,
only making use of our definition of conditional belief.
Interpreting m(A) as the probability of having knowledge A naturally
leads to a probability distribution P on the collections of subsets of Ω. That
is, for A ⊆ 2Ω we write
P (A) =
∑
A∈A
m(A). (3.3)
The belief in A now is the probability that A is implied, that is
Bel(A) = P ({C ∈ 2Ω : C ⊆ A}). (3.4)
We can now express (3.1) in terms of P by writing for A 6= ∅
mH(A) =
∑
C∩H=Am(C)∑
C∩H 6=∅m(C)
=
P ({C ⊆ Ω : C ∩H = A})
P ({C ⊆ Ω : C ∩H 6= ∅})
= P ({C ⊆ Ω : C ∩H = A} | {C ⊆ Ω : C ∩H 6= ∅}).
(3.5)
Conditional belief can be expressed as
BelH(A) =
∑
B⊆A
mH(B)
=
∑
B⊆A
P ({C ⊆ Ω : C ∩H = B} | {C ⊆ Ω : C ∩H 6= ∅})
= P ({C ⊆ Ω : C ∩H ⊆ A} | {C ⊆ Ω : C ∩H 6= ∅}).
(3.6)
In words, (3.5) and (3.6) show that our notion of conditioning can be seen as
classically conditioning P on the collection of outcomes that are consistent
with H, and then lumping all outcomes that are the same under H together.
Example 3.2. In the special case that Bel = P is a probability distribution,
the notion of conditional belief coincides with the notion of conditional
probability, i.e.
BelH(A) =
∑
ω∈A∩H m({ω})∑
ω∈H m({ω})
= P (A|H), (3.7)
for every A ⊆ Ω and H such that 1− Bel(Hc) = P (H) > 0.
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Example 3.3. Suppose we have a case in which the suspects are two parents
and their son, so Ω = {Father,Mother,Son}. We have a lot of evidence that
points to the parents, none of which points to one of them in particular.
Further, we have some evidence that points to the son. The corresponding
basic belief assignment is, say, m({Father,Mother}) = 910 and m({Son}) =
1
10 . Under the hypothesis H that it is a man, i.e. H = {Father,Son}, the
evidence against the parents counts as evidence against the father, so
mH({Father}) =
9
10
. (3.8)
The next example shows that while (2.6) holds, there are Bel and A,H ⊆
Ω such that
BelH(A) 6= inf{P (A|H) : P ∈ PBel}. (3.9)
The right hand side in (3.9) goes under the name FH-conditioning,
after Fagin and Halpern [4]. Hence, the example shows that Dempster-
conditioning, and FH-conditioning need not lead to the same result.
Example 3.4. (Continuation of Example 3.3.) The collection of probability
distributions that we can obtain by distributing weight on {Father,Mother}
over {Father} and {Mother} is
PBel =
{
Pc : 0 ≤ c ≤
9
10
}
, (3.10)
where the probability distribution Pc : 2
Ω → [0, 1] is given by
Pc({Father}) := c,
Pc({Mother}) :=
9
10
− c,
Pc({Son}) :=
1
10
.
(3.11)
Since
Pc({Father}|H) =
c
c+ 110
, (3.12)
we find
inf{P ({Father}|H) : P ∈ PBel} = 0. (3.13)
Compared to (3.8), we think the answer in (3.8) seems more appropriate
than the one in (3.13).
Although our notion of conditioning generalizes the classical notion,
there are significant differences between our conditioning and the classical
one. To this end, consider the following instructive example which we
subsequently discuss, and which appears in a slightly different formulation
also in [11].
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Example 3.5. Suppose Ω = {0, 1}2, and write an element of Ω as (x, y).
Consider the following basic belief assignment m on Ω:
m

 x = 0 x = 1y = 0 ∗
y = 1 ∗

 = 1
2
(3.14)
and
m

 x = 0 x = 1y = 0 ∗
y = 1 ∗

 = 1
2
. (3.15)
Following the rules of our calculus, it is not difficult to see that Bel(x =
y) = 0. However, this outcome may not be so intuitive at first sight, which
becomes apparent when we first condition on the outcome of y. Indeed,
we have that Bely=0(x = y) = Bely=1(x = y) =
1
2 while at the same time
Bel(x = y) = 0. This phenomenon deserves a discussion.
We can gain understanding of the paradox in Example 3.5 by looking at
the law of total probability from classical probability calculus:
P (A) = P (A|Bc)P (Bc) + P (A|B)P (B), (3.16)
for all events A and B with P (B) > 0. This law, combined with the fact
that P (B) + P (Bc) = 1, gives the very intuitive result that if P (A|B) =
P (A|Bc) = α, say, then it follows that P (A) must also be equal to α. (In
some references this phenomenon is called the sandwich principle, see e.g.
[11] and references therein.) However, the analogue for belief functions,
that is, if BelB(A) = BelBc(A) = α, then it follows that Bel(A) must also
be equal to α, does not hold in general, as Example 3.5 illustrates. We now
explain why this does not hold in Example 3.5.
First we note that Bely=0(x = y) = Bely=1(x = y) =
1
2 is not at all
controversial: if we simply know the value of y, then all uncertainty that
is left, is that of a fair coin flip. The paradox arises, because at the same
time we have Bel(x = y) = 0. This zero belief is explained by the fact that
we do not know how the outcome of y is produced. It may in fact be the
case that for some reason we do not know, the outcome of y is always the
opposite of x. Therefore, our belief in x = y should indeed be zero. Based on
Bely=0(x = y) and Bely=1(x = y), for which how y is produced is completely
irrelevant, we can not infer anything about Bel(x = y).
It would be an entirely different matter to condition on the outcome of
x. We know how the outcome of x is produced, namely as the result of a
fair coin flip. And once we know the outcome of x, we are still ignorant
about the outcome of y, i.e. Belx=0(x = y) = Belx=1(x = y) = 0 and
therefore it is completely reasonable to conclude that Bel(x = y) = 0. So
when we condition on x, then the paradox does not arise. This is a special
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case of a more general situation in which an analogue of the law of total
probability does hold, which we express in the following lemma. The proof
follows immediately from definitions.
Lemma 3.6. Let B1, . . . , Bn ⊆ Ω be a partition of Ω such that Bel(Bi) > 0
for every i and for every C with m(C) > 0 we have C ⊆ Bi for some i.
Then
n∑
i=1
Bel(Bi) = 1 and Bel(A) =
n∑
i=1
Bel(Bi)BelBi(A) (3.17)
for all A ⊆ Ω.
Notice that in Example 3.5 with B1 = {y = 0} and B2 = {y = 1}, the
condition of the lemma is, as expected, not satisfied. For A = {x = y}, the
second part of (3.17) does hold, because we do have that
Bel(x = y) = Bely=0(x = y)Bel(y = 0) + Bely=1(x = y)Bel(y = 1),
since both sides are equal to zero. However, the second part of (3.17) does
not always hold, since for A = {x = 0} we find
Bel(x = 0) 6= Bely=0(x = 0)Bel(y = 0) + Bely=1(x = 0)Bel(y = 1).
4 Independence
Now that we have a notion of conditioning, we can also introduce a notion
of independence, and to this end we consider the following situation. Let
Ω1 and Ω2 be outcome spaces of two phenomena that we would describe as
‘independent’. Now we consider this two phenomena simultaneously. We set
Ω := Ω1 × Ω2 and let X : Ω → Ω1 and Y : Ω → Ω2 be the projections onto
respectively the first and second coordinate. On Ω we define a basic belief
assignment m : 2Ω → [0, 1] and corresponding belief function Bel. We want
m and Bel to reflect the ‘independent’ nature of the two phenomena. To do
that, we need a mathematical definition of independence that is consistent
with our intuitive idea about ‘independence’.
There are now at least three natural ways to proceed, and we explore
them now, together with their relationships.
In the first approach we take conditional beliefs as the starting point,
and require that
BelY ∈B(X ∈ A) = Bel(X ∈ A) (4.1)
and
BelX∈A(Y ∈ B) = Bel(Y ∈ B), (4.2)
for all A ⊆ Ω1 and B ⊆ Ω2 for which the conditional beliefs are defined. It
is not difficult to show directly that (4.1) and (4.2) are equivalent, but this
will follow also from Theorem 4.3 below, so we do not prove this here.
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In the second approach, we proceed via a product form for the belief
Bel(X ∈ A;Y ∈ B). As a natural generalization of independence in
probability theory, we require that this product is equal to the product
of the ‘marginal’ beliefs, i.e.
Bel(X ∈ A;Y ∈ B) = Bel(X ∈ A)Bel(Y ∈ B), (4.3)
for all A ⊆ Ω1 and B ⊆ Ω2.
Instead of looking at a product form for Bel(X ∈ A;Y ∈ B), we can also
look at a product form for m(X ∈ A;Y ∈ B), which is our third approach.
We first define Bel1 and Bel2 to be the ‘marginal’ belief functions, i.e.
Bel1(A) := Bel(X ∈ A) and Bel2(B) := Bel(Y ∈ B), (4.4)
for all A ⊆ Ω1 and B ⊆ Ω2. It follows from Theorem 2.7 that Bel1 and Bel2
are indeed belief functions. Let m1 and m2 the corresponding ‘marginal’
basic belief assignments of respectively Bel1 and Bel2. Since
Bel1(A) =
∑
B⊆A×Ω2
m(B)
=
∑
B| X(B)⊆A
m(B)
=
∑
B⊆A
∑
C| X(C)=B
m(C),
(4.5)
it follows that
m1(A) =
∑
C | X(C)=A
m(C). (4.6)
A similar expression of course is true for m2. Notice that m1(A) is in general
not the same as m(X ∈ A), since the set {X ∈ A} is in general not the only
set with positive basic belief which projects onto A. Our third approach to
independence uses classical independence to require that
m(X ∈ A;Y ∈ B) = m1(A)m2(B) (4.7)
for all A ⊆ Ω1 and B ⊆ Ω2.
Now we investigate the relations between the three approaches. The
next two examples show that the requirements of respectively the first and
second approach are weaker than the requirement of the third.
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Example 4.1. Suppose Ω1 = Ω2 = {0, 1} and
m

 X=0 X=1Y=0 ∗ ∗
Y=1 ∗ ∗

 = 1
4
,
m

 X=0 X=1Y=0 ∗
Y=1

 = 1
2
,
m

 X=0 X=1Y=0 ∗ ∗
Y=1 ∗

 = 1
4
.
(4.8)
Then
BelY=1(X = 1) = BelY=0(X = 1) = Bel(X = 1) = 0,
BelY=1(X = 0) = BelY=0(X = 0) = Bel(X = 0) =
1
2
,
(4.9)
so the requirement of the first approach is satisfied. But
1
2
= m(X = 0;Y = 0) 6= m1({0})m2({0}) =
1
2
·
1
2
=
1
4
. (4.10)
Example 4.2. Suppose Ω1 = Ω2 = {0, 1} and
m

 X=0 X=1Y=0 ∗
Y=1 ∗

 = 1. (4.11)
We have
Bel(X ∈ A;Y ∈ B) = Bel(X ∈ A)Bel(Y ∈ B) (4.12)
trivially for all A,B ⊆ {0, 1}, but
0 = m(X ∈ {0, 1};Y ∈ {0, 1}) 6= m1({0, 1})m2({0, 1}) = 1. (4.13)
As suggested by the examples, the problem is that there is positive mass
on sets that are not ‘rectangular’, i.e. S ⊆ Ω such that S 6= X(S)× Y (S).
Consider a C ⊆ Ω with m(C) > 0. The set X(C) ⊆ Ω1 gives the
outcomes of the first phenomenon that C is consistent with. If we condition
on {Y = y} for some y ∈ Y (C), evidence for C will become evidence for
C ∩ {Y = y}. Since we want to model the two phenomena as independent,
it is reasonable to ask that conditioning on {Y = y} changes nothing about
the outcomes of the first phenomenon that this individual piece of evidence
is consistent with. So
∀y ∈ Y (C) X(C ∩ {Y = y}) = X(C). (4.14)
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It follows directly that (4.14) holds if and only if C = X(C) × Y (C). If
m(C) > 0 only if C = X(C) × Y (C), we say that m concentrates on
rectangles. Adding this constraint to the requirements of the first two
approaches, makes all three approaches equivalent.
Theorem 4.3. The following statements are equivalent:
(1) m concentrates on rectangles and
BelY ∈B(X ∈ A) = Bel(X ∈ A) (4.15)
for all A ⊆ Ω1 and B ⊆ Ω2 with Bel(Y ∈ B
c) 6= 1,
(2) m concentrates on rectangles and
Bel(X ∈ A;Y ∈ B) = Bel(X ∈ A)Bel(Y ∈ B) (4.16)
for all A ⊆ Ω1 and B ⊆ Ω2,
(3) we have
m(X ∈ A;Y ∈ B) = m1(A)m2(B) (4.17)
for all A ⊆ Ω1 and B ⊆ Ω2.
Proof. We prove (1)⇒(2), (2)⇒(3) and (3)⇒(1).
We start with (1)⇒(2), so assume (1) holds. First we note that in general
it holds that Bel(A∪B) = Bel(A)+Bel(B)−Bel(A∩B) if for every C ⊆ A∪B
with m(C) > 0 we have either C ⊆ A or C ⊆ B. Because m concentrates
on rectangles, we have that for every C ⊆ {X ∈ A∨Y ∈ B} with m(C) > 0
that C ⊆ {X ∈ A} or C ⊆ {Y ∈ B}. So
Bel(X ∈ A ∨ Y ∈ B) = Bel(X ∈ A) + Bel(Y ∈ B)− Bel(X ∈ A;Y ∈ B)
(4.18)
for every A ⊆ Ω1 and B ⊆ Ω2.
Now let A ⊆ Ω1 and B ⊆ Ω2 such that B(Y ∈ B) 6= 1. We find using
respectively (1), (3.2) and (4.18), that
Bel(X ∈ A) = BelY ∈Bc(X ∈ A)
=
Bel(X ∈ A ∨ Y ∈ B)− Bel(Y ∈ B)
1− Bel(Y ∈ B)
=
Bel(X ∈ A)− Bel(X ∈ A;Y ∈ B)
1− Bel(Y ∈ B)
.
(4.19)
Rewriting this equation gives
Bel(X ∈ A;Y ∈ B) = Bel(X ∈ A)Bel(Y ∈ B). (4.20)
Now we note that (4.20) is trivially true for A ⊆ Ω1 and B ⊆ Ω2 with
Bel(Y ∈ B) = 1, so (2) holds.
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We continue with (2)⇒(3), so assume (2) holds. We prove (3) by
induction on |A| + |B|. Clearly, if |A| + |B| = 0 for A ⊆ Ω1 and
B ⊆ Ω2, then m(X ∈ A;Y ∈ B) = 0 = m1(A)m2(B). Now suppose
that m(X ∈ A′;Y ∈ B′) = m1(A
′)m2(B
′) for all A′ ⊆ Ω1 and B
′ ⊆ Ω2 with
|A′|+ |B′| < n. Let A ⊆ Ω1 and B ⊆ Ω2 be such that |A|+ |B| = n. Because
of (2) we have
m(X ∈ A;Y ∈ B)
= Bel(X ∈ A;Y ∈ B)−
∑
A′⊆A,B′⊆B
|A′|+|B′|<n
m(X ∈ A′;Y ∈ B′)
= Bel(X ∈ A)Bel(Y ∈ B)−
∑
A′⊆A,B′⊆B
|A′|+|B′|<n
m(X ∈ A′;Y ∈ B′)
(4.21)
Our induction hypothesis gives
∑
A′⊆A,B′⊆B
|A′|+|B′|<n
m(X ∈ A′;Y ∈ B′)
=
∑
A′⊆A,B′⊆B
|A′|+|B′|<n
m1(A
′)m2(B
′)
=
∑
B(B′
m1(A)m2(B
′) +
∑
A′(A
∑
B′⊆B
m1(A
′)m2(B
′)
= m1(A)(Bel(Y ∈ B)−m2(B)) + Bel(Y ∈ B)(Bel(X ∈ A)−m1(A))
= −m1(A)m2(B) + Bel(Y ∈ B)Bel(X ∈ A).
(4.22)
Combining (4.21) and (4.22) gives us m(X ∈ A;Y ∈ B) = m1(A)m2(B).
So (3) holds.
The only implication left to show is (3)⇒(1), so assume (3) holds.
Because m1 and m2 are basic belief assignments on respectively Ω1 and
Ω2 we find
∑
A⊆Ω1
∑
B⊆Ω2
m(X ∈ A;Y ∈ B) =
∑
A⊆Ω1
m1(A)
∑
B⊆Ω2
m2(B) = 1. (4.23)
This implies m(C) = 0 if C 6= {X ∈ A;Y ∈ B} for some A ⊆ Ω1 and
B ∈ Ω2. Hence m concentrates on rectangles. Further, for A ⊆ Ω1 and
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B ⊆ Ω2 such that Bel(Y ∈ B
c) 6= 1, we have
BelY ∈B(X ∈ A) =
∑
A′⊆A
∑
B′⊆Bm(X ∈ A
′;Y ∈ B′)
1−
∑
A′⊆Ω1
∑
B′⊆Bc m(X ∈ A
′;Y ∈ B′)
=
∑
A′⊆Am1(A
′)
∑
B′⊆B m2(B
′)
1−
∑
A′⊆Ω1
m1(A′)
∑
B′⊆Bc m2(B
′)
=
∑
A′⊆Am1(A
′)
∑
B′⊆Bm2(B
′)
1−
∑
B′⊆Bc m2(B
′)
=
∑
A′⊆Am1(A
′)
∑
B′⊆Bm2(B
′)∑
B′⊆B m2(B
′)
=
∑
A′⊆A
m1(A
′) = Bel(X ∈ A).
(4.24)
So (1) holds.
We take the requirement of the third approach to be our actual definition
of independence.
Definition 4.4. The projections X and Y are independent if for all A ⊆ Ω1
and B ⊆ Ω2 we have
m(X ∈ A;Y ∈ B) = m1(A)m2(B).
Our notion of independence generalizes the classical notion. In fact, in
the classical situation m concentrates on singletons, which of course are all
rectangles and hence the three approaches of independence are the same in
that case.
To see how we can interpret independence, we write the P from (3.3) for
the probability distribution corresponding to m on Ω1 × Ω2 and we write
P1 and P2 for the probability distributions corresponding to respectively m1
and m2. It follows directly from the definitions that
P ({{X ∈ A;Y ∈ B} : A ∈ A, B ∈ B}) = P1(A)P2(B) (4.25)
for all A ⊆ 2Ω1 and B ⊆ 2Ω2 , is equivalent with Definition 4.4. So (4.25)
gives an interpretation of our notion of independence: for any A ⊆ 2Ω1 and
B ⊆ 2Ω2 , the probability we have an outcome for X in A and an outcome
for Y in B is the product of the individual probabilities.
Now that we have introduced independence, we revisit Example 3.5.
Example 4.5. Consider the situation in Example 3.5 again. The basic belief
assignment described there arises for instance when X denotes the outcome
of someone flipping a fair coin, and we have no information whatsoever about
the way the outcome of Y and how it is produced. Indeed, the marginal
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belief function of X simply assigns mass 12 to both outcomes, whereas the
marginal of Y represents complete ignorance.
It is easy to check that X and Y are independent. In fact, if we want the
marginal belief functions of X and Y to be as given, X and Y are necessarily
independent. This may sound strange, but notice that in our theory Y is
‘degenerate’, since its marginal belief function concentrates on {0, 1}. In
the classical theory, it is also the case that a degenerate random variable is
independent of any other random variable on the same probability space.
5 Rejection of Dempster’s rule of combination
As we have mentioned in the introduction, we do not need Dempster’s rule
of combination. Nevertheless we want to spend some lines on it, because
this rule has been the most important reason to reject the theory of belief
function in the past. Now that we have developed our notions of conditioning
and independence, we can explain why we think Dempster’s rule deserves
no place in our theory of belief functions.
We start by introducing the rule. Suppose m1 and m2 are two basic
belief assignments on the same space Ω. Dempster’s rule of combination
states that if m1 and m2 are ‘based on independent evidence’, we can define
a canonical basic belief assignment m1 ⊕m2 on Ω ‘combining’ m1 and m2,
and which is given by
(m1 ⊕m2)(A) =
∑
B,C|B∩C=Am1(B)m2(C)
1−
∑
B,C|B∩C=∅m1(B)m2(C)
. (5.1)
It is easy to check that m1 ⊕m2 is indeed a basic belief assignment on
Ω, but we think this basic belief assignment is in general not in any way
a meaningful ‘combination’ of m1 and m2. To see why, we first use our
own theory of belief functions to interpret (5.1). We define a basic belief
assignmentm on the product space Ω2 by treating m1 andm2 as basic belief
assignments corresponding to independent phenomena, using Definition 4.4,
i.e.
m(A×B) := m1(A)m2(B) (5.2)
for A,B ⊆ Ω. Let H := {(ω, ω) : ω ∈ Ω} ⊆ Ω2, which is the set for which
the outcomes are identical. Then for nonempty A ⊆ Ω we find
mH({(ω, ω) : ω ∈ A}) =
∑
D∩H={(ω,ω) : ω∈A}m(D)
1−
∑
D∩H=∅m(D)
=
∑
D1,D2 | D1∩D2=A
m1(D1)m2(D2)
1−
∑
D1,D2 | D1∩D2=∅
m1(D1)m2(D2)
= (m1 ⊕m2)(A).
(5.3)
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Equation 5.3 shows that if m1 and m2 describe independent phenomena,
m1 ⊕m2 is the basic belief assignment after we learned that they had the
same outcome. This is curious because m1 and m2 are concerning the
same phenomenon, which is the very opposite of m1 and m2 describing
independent phenomena. We think that this is the heart of the problem
of Dempster’s rule: it does some computation treating m1 and m2 as
corresponding to independent phenomena, while the description claims
it does some computation treating m1 and m2 as corresponding to the
same phenomenon. The confusion between ‘independent evidence’ and
independent phenomena may find its origin in the problematic nature
of the notion of ‘independent evidence’: if evidence concerns the same
phenomenon, then automatically the all evidence is dependent because all
the evidence depends on the true outcome of the phenomenon. Whatever
one precisely means with ‘independent evidence’, however, it is clear that
it should not be the same as evidence concerning independent phenomena.
This leads to absurd results, like the following example illustrates.
Example 5.1. Suppose we are going to flip a coin and set Ω = {h, t} for
the outcomes, where h stands for head and t for tail. Previous flips of the
coin have given us the information that head comes up 60% of times, hence
m1({h}) =
3
5 and m1({t}) =
2
5 . A second investigation based on the shape
of the coin leads to the same conclusion, so m2 = m1. Then combining these
two basic belief assignments using Dempster’s rule gives
(m1 ⊕m2)({h}) =
(
3
5
)2(
3
5
)2
+
(
2
5
)2 = 913 ≈ 0.69 (5.4)
and
(m1 ⊕m2)({t}) =
(
2
5
)2(
3
5
)2
+
(
2
5
)2 = 413 ≈ 0.31. (5.5)
Hence Dempster’s rule leads to the conclusion that the coin is much more
biased than both of our two sources of evidence agreed on. Although one
could try to argue that confirmation could lead to more belief, it should at
least not lead to less belief. This is of course exactly what happens with
our belief in the outcome ‘tail’: while m1({t} = m2({t} =
2
5 , we have (m1⊕
m2)({t}) =
4
13 <
2
5 . From this it follows that the only acceptable outcome
of ‘combining’ m1 and m2 = m1 would be m1 again and not m1 ⊕m2.
We reject Dempster’s rule and do not see any need for a rule that
‘combines’ basic belief assignments on the same space. Since the theory of
belief functions is a generalization of probability theory, we think it makes
sense to generalize concepts like conditioning and independence. Probability
theory, however, does not have a canonical rule for ‘combining’ probability
distributions on the same outcome space into a new canonical probability
distribution. Both probability theory and our theory of belief functions, as
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applied to forensic cases in our companion article [10] seem to function fine
without such a rule. Furthermore, the fact that in the well studied case
of probability distributions such a rule is not known, gives us reason to be
skeptical about being able to construct a plausible rule for the general case.
6 Examples
We start with an example from the forensic setting, and show how our theory
can avoid the problem of having to choose a prior, producing a less arbitrary
result. This is a typical case in which we think our theory should be used,
and we once more refer to our companion paper [10] for further forensic
examples. After that, we also discuss a more traditional gambling example.
6.1 A forensic example
Suppose we know that one of two persons, say A and B, has committed a
certain crime. We write E for the event that the person that committed the
crime and A both have a certain (DNA) characteristic that occurs in the
total population with probability p. Notice that, before we know E, we do
not know that the person that committed the crime has the characteristic.
We write G for the guilt of A. We are interested in G given E.
The typical way to deal with this classically, is to use Bayes’ rule that
states
P (G|E) =
P (E|G)P (G)
P (E|G)P (G) + P (E|Gc)P (Gc)
. (6.1)
Whatever the interpretation of the classical probability measure P , subjec-
tive, frequentistic or otherwise, P (G|E) represents the posterior probability
of guilt conditioned on the available evidence, while P (G) denotes the prior
probability of guilt, before taking the evidence E into account. From our
information, we can conclude that P (E|G) = p and P (E|Gc) = p2. There
is, however, no reason to assign any positive prior probability to either G or
Gc. But since classical probability requires that P (G) +P (Gc) = 1, by lack
of a better alternative, a uniform prior P (G) = P (Gc) = 12 is usually taken,
which leads to
P (G|E) =
1
2p
1
2p
2 + 12p
=
1
1 + p
. (6.2)
We can re-derive the answer in (6.2) in our setting, using the following
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basic belief assigment based on a uniform prior on the guilt of A:
m(E ∩G) =m

 Gc GEc
E ∗

 = 1
2
p,
m(Ec ∩G) =m

 Gc GEc ∗
E

 = 1
2
(1− p),
m(E ∩Gc) =m

 Gc GEc
E ∗

 = 1
2
p2,
m(Ec ∩Gc) =m

 Gc GEc ∗
E

 = 1
2
(1− p2).
(6.3)
Then we find that
BelE(G) =
1
2p
1
2p
2 + 12p
=
1
1 + p
. (6.4)
In our theory the problem of choosing a prior can be resolved, since belief
functions are more flexible than probability distributions. We will explain
this now.
What we do, is determine what we actually know in certain scenarios.
If A does not have the characteristic, which happens with probability 1− p,
then we know Ec but we do not know anything about the guilt of A. If
A and B both have the characteristic, which happens with probability p2,
then we know E but again we do not know anything about the guilt of A.
If A has the characteristic and B has not, which happens with probability
p(1 − p), we know that either Ec or G. This leads to the following basic
belief assignment:
m(Ec) =m

 Gc GEc ∗ ∗
E

 = 1− p,
m(E) =m

 Gc GEc
E ∗ ∗

 = p2,
m(Ec ∪G) =m

 Gc GEc ∗ ∗
E ∗

 = p(1− p).
(6.5)
This basic belief assignments does not give any prior belief on the guilt of A
since Bel(G) = Bel(Gc) = 0. If we condition on E, however, we can simply
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compute, using our rule of conditioning, that
BelE(G) =
p(1− p)
p(1− p) + p2
= 1− p, (6.6)
which is a smaller number than the classical answer.
6.2 A gambling example
In a casino, two croupiers execute the following procedure independently
of each other. First, a fair coin is flipped. After that, the croupiers get,
with probability p, the opportunity to change the outcome of the coin flip,
again independently of each other. How in such a situation the croupiers
make their decisions about changing or not, is unknown by the player. After
the two results are produced, but before the player knows the outcomes, the
player is told whether or not the produced outcomes of the two croupiers are
the same. This means that of the four possible combinations of outcomes,
only two remain, and these are the two outcomes on which the player can
bet.
We write Ω1 = {h, t} for the outcome space of the first croupier, where
h stands for ‘head’ and t for ‘tail’, and we define the basic belief assignment
m1 : 2
Ω1 → [0, 1] by m1({h}) = m1({t}) =
1
2 (1 − p) and m1({h, t}) = p.
We write Ω2 = {h, t} for the outcome space of the second croupier and set
m2 : 2
Ω2 → [0, 1] similar to m1. On Ω = {h, t}
2, using our definition of
independence, we get m : 2Ω → [0, 1] given by
m

 h th ∗
t

 = m

 h th
t ∗


= m

 h th ∗
t

 = m

 h th
t ∗


=
1
4
(1− p)2,
(6.7)
m

 h th ∗
t ∗

 = m

 h th
t ∗ ∗


= m

 h th ∗ ∗
t

 = m

 h th ∗
t ∗


=
1
2
p(1− p),
(6.8)
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and
m

 h th ∗ ∗
t ∗ ∗

 = p2. (6.9)
We write S = {(h, h), (t, t)} for the event that the outcomes of the two
croupiers are the same. Using our rule of conditioning, we compute our
belief in (h, h) in case we get the information that the results were the same:
BelS({(h, h)}) =
1
4 (1− p)
2 + p(1− p)
1− 12(1− p)
2
. (6.10)
Obviously, BelS({(t, t)}) has the same value, and
BelS({(t, t)}) + BelS({(h, h)}) = 1−mS(S) = 1− p
2. (6.11)
The quantity p2 can be seen as the price we have to pay for our uncertainty
about the decisions of the croupiers. Notice that if p = 0, we simply have
two fair coin flips and (6.10) equals 12 . If p = 1, we are completely ignorant
and (6.10) equals 0.
We now investigate how we can model this game with classical proba-
bility distributions. In that case we have to make the assumption that both
croupiers make their decision according to some probability distribution.
This means that there are probabilities p1, p2 that respectively the first
and second result (after possible changes of the croupiers) are head. The
definition of the game implies that
p1, p2 ∈
[
1
2
(1− p),
1
2
(1 + p)
]
. (6.12)
Now we set P : 2Ω → [0, 1] by P ({(h, h)}) = p1p2, P ({(h, t)}) = p1(1− p2),
P ({(t, h)}) = (1− p1)p2 and P ({(t, t)}) = (1− p1)(1− p2). It follows that
P ({(h, h)}|S) =
p1p2
p1p2 + (1− p1)(1 − p2)
, (6.13)
and an easy computation shows that (6.13) is contained in the interval[
1
2(1− p)
2
1 + p2
,
1
2(1 + p)
2
1 + p2
]
. (6.14)
Note that our answer in (6.10) is contained in this interval.
To understand the difference between (6.10) and (6.13), note that the two
approaches treat conditioning fundamentally different. In a classical setting,
one first needs to choose and fix p1 and p2 before the concept of conditioning
even makes sense. In our approach with belief functions, however, we treat
24
the uncertainty about the decisions of the croupiers on the same level as
our other uncertainty, making it possible to condition without making any
assumptions about the decisions of the croupiers first.
We can make this global assessment more concrete by looking at an
example. Suppose that we are in the classical situation, and that the
croupiers try to get tail. That is, if first head comes up and they get the
opportunity to change, then they choose tail. If tails comes up, they never
change. This boils down to p1 = p2 =
1
2 (1 − p) and corresponds to the left
endpoint of the interval in (6.14).
Now consider the event that the first croupier flips a head and does
not get the chance to revise the outcome, and the second croupier does get
the chance to revise the outcome, an event with probability 12p(1 − p). In
the classical setting which we described, this event implies that the second
croupier chooses a tail and hence the outcome (h, t) is not in S. The mass
assigned to this event, hence, only plays a role in the normalizing factor
when we condition on S.
In the theory of belief functions however, the conditioning works
fundamentally different. Considering the same event as described above,
the probability mass of this event does not end up in the normalizing factor,
but is instead added to the final belief in (h, h), because given S, it is implied
that the choice of the second croupier was head.
It is an interesting question as to which answer one would choose in a real
betting situation. The conditional probability of (h, h) given S can be safely
said to be at least the left endpoint of the interval in (6.14), and perhaps
this is the only number someone analyzing the situation clasically, wants to
use if you can bet only once. In the theory of belief functions however, one
would choose for the answer in (6.10) in case of a unique betting situation.
Of course, when we repeat the betting experiment many times, one might
get insight in the strategy of the croupiers, and this might be a reason to
use the classical theory with appropriate values of p1 and p2.
7 The relation between belief functions and PBel
Let m : 2Ω → [0, 1] be a basic belief assignment. Let PBel be the collection
of probability distributions (already introduced in Section 2) on Ω that we
can obtain by distributing for every C ⊆ Ω a probability mass of m(C) over
the elements of C. If A ⊆ Ω, then for every C ⊆ Ω with C \ A 6= ∅, we can
assign a probability mass of m(C) to an element outside A. Thus we have
inf{P (A) : P ∈ PBel} =
∑
C⊆A
m(C) = Bel(A). (7.1)
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This leads to an interpretation of belief as ‘minimum probability’. As we
already showed in Example 3.4, there are Bel and A,H ⊆ Ω such that
BelH(A) 6= inf{P (A|H) : P ∈ PBel}. (7.2)
This makes our theory distinct from a ‘lower probability’ theory of belief
functions, see e.g. [16]. Lemma 7.1 shows how we can properly express BelH
in terms of PBel.
Lemma 7.1. BelH(A) = inf {P (A|H) : P ∈ PBel and P (H
c) = Bel(Hc)} .
Proof.
BelH(A) =
Bel(A ∪Hc)− Bel(Hc)
1− Bel(Hc)
=
inf{P (A ∪Hc) : P ∈ PBel} − inf{P (H
c) : P ∈ PBel}
1− inf{P (Hc) : P ∈ PBel}
= inf
{
P (A ∪Hc)− P (Hc)
1− P (Hc)
: P ∈ PBel and P (H
c) = Bel(Hc)
}
= inf
{
P (A ∩H)
P (H)
: P ∈ PBel and P (H
c) = Bel(Hc)
}
= inf {P (A|H) : P ∈ PBel and P (H
c) = Bel(Hc)} .
(7.3)
Lemma 7.1 tells us that conditional belief is not the infimum over all
conditional probabilities in PBel, but only over a sub-collection of PBel.
Notice that this implies that BelH(A) ≥ inf{P (A|H) : P ∈ PBel}. By
only considering P ∈ PBel with P (H
c) = Bel(Hc) in (7.3), we are discarding
distributions of PBel on the basis that we have learned H. This means that
in our theory, the collection PBel should be interpreted as a collection from
which we can discard distributions if we have reasons to do so. In particular,
this means that we can not interpret PBel as containing the ‘correct’ or
‘actual’ probability distribution, without knowing which one it is. This is
because if we interpret PBel that way, we are not allowed to discard any
element of PBel, since by discarding a distribution we might discard the
actual distribution.
We conclude by expressing independence in terms of PBel. Consider the
situation of Section 4 again and observe that
inf{P (X ∈ A;Y ∈ B) : P ∈ PBel}
= inf{P1(A)P2(B) : P1 ∈ PBel1 , P2 ∈ PBel2}
(7.4)
for all A ⊆ Ω1 and B ⊆ Ω2, is equivalent with the requirement of the second
approach.
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8 A law of large numbers
Since we only have developed our theory for finite outcome spaces, we
present a ‘weak’ law of large numbers. Let X : Ω → R, m : 2Ω → [0, 1]
be a basic belief assignment and Bel the corresponding belief function. To
state our theorem, we need to generalize the concept ‘expectation’ to our
setting. There are various ways to generalize the concept, but because we
aim at proving a law of large numbers, we want to define the expectation
of X such that it is a ‘guaranteed lower bound’ of the average of many
independent ‘copies’ of X. This leads to the following definition.
Definition 8.1. The expectation of X (with respect to m) is
Exp(X) :=
∑
C⊆Ω
m(C)min
ω∈C
X(ω). (8.1)
In case Bel = P is a probability distribution, we have
Exp(X) =
∑
ω∈Ω
m({ω})X(ω) =
∑
ω∈Ω
P ({ω})X(ω) = E(X), (8.2)
and thus Definition 8.1 is consistent with the concept of expectation for
probability distributions.
First, we want to show that in the long run, Exp(A) is an lower bound for
the average of n independent ‘copies’ of X. Secondly, we want to show that
there is no bigger lower bound than Exp(A). We make this precise. On Ωn
we use Definition 4.4 to define the basic belief assignment mn : 2
Ωn → [0, 1]
as
mn(A1 × · · · ×An) :=
n∏
j=1
m(Aj), (8.3)
making all projections independent. Let Beln be the corresponding belief
function. We set Xj : Ω
n → R by
Xj((ω1, ω2, . . . , ωn)) := X(ωj). (8.4)
Theorem 8.2. For every ǫ > 0 we have
lim
n→∞
Beln

 1
n
n∑
j=1
Xj ≥ Exp(X)− ǫ

 = 1 (8.5)
and
lim
n→∞
Beln

 1
n
n∑
j=1
Xj ≥ Exp(X) + ǫ

 = 0. (8.6)
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Proof. Let ǫ > 0 be given. We define the probability distribution P by
P ({C}) := m(C) and Pn by
Pn({(C1, C2, . . . , Cn)}) :=
n∏
j=1
m(Cj) =
n∏
j=1
P ({Cj}). (8.7)
We define the random variable Xˆ : 2Ω → R by
Xˆ(C) := min
ω∈C
X(ω) (8.8)
and let Xˆj : (2
Ω)n → R be given by
Xˆj((C1, C2, . . . , Cn)) := Xˆ(Cj). (8.9)
Observe that for any α ∈ [0, 1] we have
Beln

 1
n
n∑
j=1
Xj ≥ α


= Pn



(C1, C2, . . . , Cn) : minωj∈Cj 1n
n∑
j=1
X(ωj) ≥ α




= Pn



(C1, C2, . . . , Cn) : 1n
n∑
j=1
Xˆ(Cj) ≥ α




= Pn

 1
n
n∑
j=1
Xˆj ≥ α

 .
(8.10)
The (classical) expectation of the Xˆj is
E(Xˆj) = E(Xˆ) =
∑
C⊆Ω
P ({C})Xˆ(C) =
∑
C⊆Ω
m(C)min
ω∈C
X(ω) = Exp(X)
(8.11)
and by the definition of Pn all the Xˆ1, . . . , Xˆn are (classically) independent.
With the classical weak law of large numbers, we then find that
lim
n→∞
Beln

 1
n
n∑
j=1
Xj ≥ Exp(X) − ǫ


= lim
n→∞
Pn

 1
n
n∑
j=1
Xˆj ≥ E(Xˆ)− ǫ

 = 1
(8.12)
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and
lim
n→∞
Beln

 1
n
n∑
j=1
Xj ≥ Exp(X) + ǫ


= lim
n→∞
Pn

 1
n
n∑
j=1
Xˆj ≥ E(Xˆ) + ǫ

 = 0.
(8.13)
If we take for A ⊆ Ω the random variable 1A, then we find
Exp(1A) =
∑
C⊆Ω
m(C)min
ω∈C
1A(ω) =
∑
C⊆A
m(C) = Bel(A). (8.14)
This gives us a special case of Theorem 8.2.
Lemma 8.3 (Corollary of Theorem 8.2). For every ǫ > 0 and every A ⊆ Ω
we have
lim
n→∞
Beln

 1
n
n∑
j=1
1A(ωj) ≥ Bel(A)− ǫ

 = 1 (8.15)
and
lim
n→∞
Beln

 1
n
n∑
j=1
1A(ωj) ≥ Bel(A) + ǫ

 = 0. (8.16)
Lemma 8.3 tells us that if we write Fn(A) ∈ [0, 1] for the relative
frequency of A occurring after n independent repetitions, then the belief
Bel(A) is the greatest lower bound for Fn(A) we can give if n is large. Note,
however, that this is not the same as knowing that for every large k there
is a n > k such that Fn(A) is close to Bel(A).
Lemma 8.3 provides a frequency interpretation of belief function which
is analogous to the interpretation of the classical law of large numbers for
classical probability theory. It gives a mathematical formulation of the
intuitive idea that when we independently repeat an experiment many times,
the relative frequency of the number of occurrence of an event A should be
related to the belief in A. The fact that the belief in A is related to the
greatest lower bound for Fn(A) we can give based on our knowledge, and
not to a limit of Fn(A), reflects the difference between probabilities en belief
functions. This difference, we say once more, is the difference between on
the one hand quantifying what Fn(A) is, and on the other hand quantifying
what we know about Fn(A).
The extent to which the law of large numbers is useful depends very much
on the situation at hand. Note that we need independent repetitions of the
same experiment, and in many applications in, say, legal or forensic settings,
such independent repetitions do not make much sense. Nevertheless, even
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in these cases, it might be reassuring that under a hypothetical assumption
of independent repetitions, there is a law of large numbers which reflects the
nature of belief functions quite well. Section 6.2 contains an example which
is repeatable.
9 A betting interpretation
In a certain interpretation of probability distributions [12, 5], the probability
on a set A is seen as the price an agent is willing to buy and sell a bet for that
pays out 1 if A turns out to be true. Given the constraint that agents cannot
assign prices in such a way that they can have a guaranteed loss (a Dutch
Book), the Dutch Book Theorem tells us that probability distributions are
exactly the functions that obey the Kolmogorov axioms. Here we want to
give a similar interpretation for belief functions and derive a theorem similar
to the Dutch Book Theorem. The crux here, is that we do not look at the
price an agent is willing to buy and sell for, but only the maximum price an
agent is willing to buy for. We make that idea precise.
We consider the following scenario. An agent assigns to every subset of
S ⊆ Ω the maximum price P (S) ∈ [0, 1] she is willing to pay for the bet that
pays out 1 if S turns out to be true. First, we look at the following theorem
that gives us the constraints corresponding to probability distributions.
Theorem 9.1. A function P : 2Ω → [0, 1] is a probability distribution if
and only if
(P1) P (Ω) = 1
(P2) For all A1, A2, ..., AN ⊆ Ω and B1, B2, ..., BM ⊆ Ω such that
∀ω ∈ Ω
N∑
i=1
1Ai(ω) ≥
M∑
j=1
1Bj (ω), (9.1)
we have
N∑
i=1
P (Ai) ≥
M∑
j=1
P (Bj). (9.2)
Proof. It is sufficient to show that (P2) is equivalent with finite additivity.
First suppose (P2). Let A,B ⊆ Ω be disjoint. We have
∀ω ∈ Ω 1A(ω) + 1B(ω) = 1A∪B(ω), (9.3)
so by (P2) we find both P (A) +P (B) ≥ P (A∪B) and P (A∪B) ≥ P (A) +
P (B). So P is finitely additive.
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Now suppose that P is finitely additive. Let A1, A2, ..., AN ⊆ Ω and
B1, B2, ..., BM ⊆ Ω be such that (9.1) holds. Then
N∑
i=1
P (Ai) =
∑
ω∈Ω
P ({ω})
N∑
i=1
1Ai(ω)
≥
∑
ω∈Ω
P ({ω})
M∑
j=1
1Bi(ω)
=
M∑
j=1
P (Bj).
(9.4)
So (P2) holds.
Constraint (P1) says that an agent always pays 1 for bets on tautologies,
i.e. P (Ω) = 1. Constraint (P2) says that an agent must assign prices in such
a way that if she buys a set of bets that is guaranteed to pay out at least as
much as another set of bets, that the total price for the first set must be as
least as much as the total price of the second set of bets.
Given our interpretation of the maximum price an agent is willing to
pay for a bet, however, we think (P2) is too restrictive as illustrated by
the following example. Let Ω = {ω0, ω1} and consider an agent that is
completely ignorant about how likely ω0 or ω1 is. Of course she will be
ready to pay 1 for a bet on Ω, since payout is guaranteed. But she could
feel conservative in her ignorance and not be ready to pay anything for a
bet on {ω0} or {ω1}. However, if P ({ω0}) = P ({ω1}) = 0 while P (Ω) = 1,
then (P2) is violated.
The problem is that (P2) only compares actual payout under realizations
ω ∈ Ω. Our example shows that an agent may also be interested in
guaranteed payout of a bet on A if she only knows that the actual outcome
is an a given set S. This is in line with the epistemic interpretation which
we discussed earlier, since in this epistemic interpretation, a subset S ⊆ Ω
corresponds to knowledge about the outcome being in S without further
specification.
Hence we suggest to change (9.1) into
∀S ⊆ Ω
N∑
i=1
1(S ⊆ Ai) ≥
M∑
j=1
1(S ⊆ Bj). (9.5)
We then force the total price of the first set of bets to be at least the
total price of the second set if not only the payout is at least as big in all
cases, but also the guaranteed payout under any S is at least as big in all
cases. The following theorem states that if we make this change, we get a
characterization of belief functions.
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Theorem 9.2. A function Bel : 2Ω → [0, 1] is a belief function if and only
if
(B1) Bel(Ω) = 1
(B2*) For all A1, A2, . . . , AN ⊆ Ω and B1, B2, . . . , BM ⊆ Ω such that
∀S ⊆ Ω
N∑
i=1
1(S ⊆ Ai) ≥
M∑
j=1
1(S ⊆ Bj), (9.6)
we have
N∑
i=1
Bel(Ai) ≥
M∑
j=1
Bel(Bj). (9.7)
Proof. Suppose (B1) and (B2*) hold. Let A,B ⊆ Ω. For all S ⊆ Ω we have
1(S ⊆ A ∪B) + 1(S ⊆ A ∩B) ≥ 1(S ⊆ A) + 1(S ⊆ B). (9.8)
So by (B2*) we find
Bel(A ∪B) + Bel(A ∩B) ≥ Bel(A) + Bel(B). (9.9)
So by Theorem 2.7 Bel is a belief function.
Now suppose Bel is a belief function. Then (B1) is immediate and we
have to show (B2*). Let m : 2Ω → [0, 1] be the corresponding basic belief
assignment of Bel. Let A1, A2, . . . , AN ⊆ Ω and B1, B2, . . . , BM ⊆ Ω be
such that (9.6) holds. Then
N∑
i=1
Bel(Ai) =
∑
S⊆Ω
m(S)
N∑
i=1
1(S ⊆ Ai)
≥
∑
S⊆Ω
m(S)
M∑
j=1
1(S ⊆ Bj)
=
M∑
j=1
Bel(Bj).
(9.10)
So (B2*) holds.
Theorem 9.2 tells us that an agent following the relaxed constraints, is
precisely an agent assigning Bel(A) as a maximum price she is willing to
pay for a bet on A (that payouts out 1 if A is true), for some belief function
Bel. This gives us our betting interpretation of belief functions.
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